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Summary
1. This study examines European Mediterranean policy as exemplified in EU relations
with the Maghreb countries. The specific object of analysis is the „Euro-
Mediterranean partnership“, which began with the „Euro-Mediterranean“ conference
in Barcelona on 27–8 November 1995.
2. Since 1957, the history of the European Community’s Mediterranean policy h s been
marked by a discrepancy between lofty aspirations and sobering practical achieve-
ments. The economic difficulties in the Maghreb have become more acute: in the
1970s and 1980s, the various association agreements did nothing to reduce the devel-
opmental gap between Europe and the North African countries.
3. With the end of the East–West conflict, the advent of German unity, and the planned
eastward expansion of the EU, the southern member-states saw themselves being
forced onto the sidelines in terms of the representation of their interests, and they set
about championing a Mediterranean initiative – analogous to the eastward line being
pursued by the EU. This coincided with the Maghreb countries’ aim of improving the
competitiveness of their national economies through economic co-operation with, and
financial support from, the EU.
4. The Barcelona conference approved an ambitious programme. The aim of the first
pillar is political and security co-operation in the Mediterranean region. Demands
here include observance of human rights, democratic norms, pluralism, and territorial
integrity. The signatory states also undertake to settle their conflicts peacefully and to
take measures to combat terrorism and organized crime. The second pillar deals with
the gradual creation, by the year 2010, of a Euro-Mediterranean free-trade area. The
aim of the third pillar is co-operation in the social and cultural domain. Action is to
be taken to promote dialogue and respect for different cultures and religions, to com-
bat racism and hostility to foreigners, and to improve cultural exchange and educa-
tional and training facilities. The European Union has made 4.685 billion ECUs avail-
able from its budget-funds for this purpose. This sum is supplemented by credits to-
talling 3.395 billion ECUs from the European Investment Bank and bilateral contribu-
tions from individual member-states.
5. The basic philosophy of the Barcelona process is that development in the Mediterra-
nean region will best be assured by the introduction of market economics and democ-
racy, and that financial help and advice from the EU can mitigate the conflicts associ-
ated with this. The EU policy consists of a combination of classic free-trade policy
(chiefly of benefit to the EU itself) and a process of dialogue intended to create a
communicational framework for regulating political, economic, and social conflicts in
the Mediterranean area.
26. As far as the security dimension is concerned, in the first three years of the Barcelona
process, co-operation has moved no further than an (arduous) exchange over confi-
dence-building; concrete agreements are still a distant prospect. In the second – eco-
nomic – pillar, activities have proceeded largely without a hitch. The main problems in
regard to implementation lie in the third area of co-operation, on the question of de-
mocratization and contacts between the various civil societies. Here, the structure of
the ruling regimes in the Maghreb is affected; here, they seek to block or control the
process of dialogue.
7. The creation of the free-trade area is one of those large-scale structural adjustment
programmes of the type commonly imposed on the developing countries since the
1980s by international financial organizations such as the World Bank and the Inter-
national Monetary Fund. The economy is to be denationalized and deregulated, and
the political-cum-administrative system is to be slimmed down and reoriented to pro-
mote the productive sectors of the national economy. The chances of the European
Union and the southern Mediterranean countries achieving the stated objectives by
means of the proposed free-trade area must, however, be viewed with the utmost cir-
cumspection. It is very unlikely that producers in the southern Mediterranean coun-
tries will be able, through rationalization and modernization, to get anywhere near the
European levels of efficiency in a short space of time. The free-trade area will also
mean the disappearance of tariff revenues that have previously played a major part in
financing the national budget. These revenues served chiefly to fuel not only the pr-
vailing clientelist power-structures but also, to a limited extent, social relief-measures
(such as basic food subsidies).
8. The Euro-Maghreb free-trade area will therefore only have a beneficial effect o  de-
velopment if functioning export-industries emerge. In view of the internally weak
capital-market and the relatively high technological requirements, it would have to be
via foreign direct investments – particularly European ones – that capital and technol-
ogy flowed into the Mediterranean countries. As compared with the status quo, the
free-trade area would considerably improve the chances of such investments. But the
latter depend on the availability of qualified manpower and adequate services, on the
presence of suitable conditions of supply and waste-disposal, and on whether the legal
and institutional framework-conditions are favourable and taxes and levies are low. In
comparison with other regions of the world, however, the Maghreb does not display
any particularly advantageous locational features when it comes to direct investment
from abroad.
9. One last option would be for the Maghreb countries to be able to exploit the increased
access to the European markets in order to sell agricultural products and finished
goods such as textiles and clothing. But this is precisely the domain in which EU im-
port barriers still apply – albeit to a lesser degree than at the time of Barcelona. The
southern EU member states, who are the most vociferous in their support for a Euro-
pean policy on the Mediterranean, are precisely the ones who are particularly keen to
insulate themselves against Maghreb competition.
310. The creation of a large-scale free-trade area in the Mediterranean region requires – in
addition to changes in the economic order – complementary action to reorg nize state
finances, render the administrative structures of the state functional, and build up
modern social-security systems. Until the end of the 1980s, the economies of the
Maghreb – embedded within a highly ramified client list system – remained under
strict state control. Reform of the economy therefore also implies changes to the sys-
tems of rule in the Maghreb. In this connection, the EU is banking on „civil society“.
And in fact, since the end of the 1980s, the process of structural adjustment has led to
society differentiating into professional associations, women’s groups, human-rights
organizations, and other non-governmental orga izations. However, it remains to be
seen whether this is sufficient as a basis for a process of democratization.
11. The EU cannot push through economic and political transformation in the face of the
apparatuses of power – even if it wanted to. The EU is therefore confronted with a
dilemma: on the one hand, it needs the compliance of the élites in order to get the
economic and political reform-process going; on the other, the implementation of the
Barcelona process will encroach on the power-based economic and political interests
of those élites. The effect of a comprehensive policy of opening-up would be to
strengthen the position of other (private) economic actors and political forces vis-à-
vis the old élites. In this connection, one cannot exclude the possibility that – as a re-
sult of social dislocations prompted by the Barcelona process – Islamist forces would
acquire even stronger influence.
12. The strategy of modernization aimed at in the Barcelona process is intended to alter
the balance of power between state and society. The EU aims to prevent any attempt
which forces opposed to reform might make to block such a development. But it also
wants to ensure that the free spaces that are to be created for social actors are not oc-
cupied by movements of an anti-Western/anti-European bent that are hostile to the
principles and norms set out in the Barcelona document. However, the possibility that
the social dislocations that will be brought about by the Barcelona process in the tran-
sitional phase will enhance rather than weaken Islamist forces cannot, so it seems, be
excluded – in fact, it is quite likely. As far as the future of Euro-Maghreb co-
operation is concerned, therefore, the question of how European states and societies
deal with the possibility of increased Isl mist influence in the region (up to an includ-
ing the sharing or assumption of power) is a crucial one.
13. Neither Islam as a religion nor Islamism as an ideology is fundamentally hostile to the
capitalist market economy. The new „Islamic order“ called for by the Islamist opposi-
tion-movements therefore does not have to be either a regression to the medieval
Muslim world or a rejection of Western capitalism and economic co-operation.
14. Islam combines within itself elements that are „hostile to democracy and pluralism“
and elements „conducive to democracy“. Amongst the „hostile“ factors used by radi-
cal Islamist groupings as an argument for creating a „theocracy“ is the requirement for
unity between politics and religion and the rejection of secularist tendencies. The goal
is the creation of an „Islamic state“ regulated by the sharia. But pronouncements
about the extent to which the Islamist opposition in the Maghreb is „capable of de-
4mocracy“ will necessarily be unsatisfactory if the only thing to which its notions of
political and economic order are contrasted is a model of democracy of European-
cum-North-American stamp. The political-cum-religious concepts of the Islamists
ought also to be set against the democratic plus and minus points of their respective
governments. Since it is likely that, in the long term, Islamist groups will occupy a
permanent place in the political spectrum of the Maghreb countries, and that they will
become major actors in the formation of a „civil society“, the present „exclusion pol-
icy“ is counterproductive. It encourages the militant Islamist trends.
15. If one considers the three countries under scrutiny here, their chances of being able to
put what the Barcelona process has to offer for their social and political development
to use in line with the above expectations varies. Algeria appears to be furthest away
from being able to participate in the free-trade area with a diversified export and im-
port structure; its internal political situation is so jammed that even the communica-
tion framework in the third pillar of the Barcelona process will probably not have any
effect in the foreseeable future. Of the three Maghreb countries, Tunisia is the furthest
advanced in structural adjustment, but this process is currently coming up against the
limits imposed on it by the political inflexibility of Ben Ali’s regime. At present, it
looks as if Morocco has the best chance of combining structural adjustment in the
economy with a liberalization and pluralization of the political regime. One explana-
tion for this may be that the country’s monarchical system of government is better
able to implement economic and social adjustment because it depends for its legitimi-
sation not so much on populist-cum-republican authoritarianism – of the sort that
prevails in Algeria and Tunisia – but on tradition and on the fact that the king controls
the military.
16. The report closes with recommendations for a deepening of the Barcelona process.
The markets of the EU should be opened up completely to suppliers from the
Maghreb, particularly in the agricultural domain and textile production. If necessary,
the southern EU states, which are resisting having a fully-fledged free-trade area in
these sectors as well, would have to secure compensation elsewhere. The advantages
to the Maghreb countries would, at all events, be much greater than the disadvantages
to the EU. As regards future implementation, the EU should make specialist training-
programmes and local credit-schemes a particular requirement. Even more important,
however, is that assistance with democratization be directed to a greater extent than
at present on the promotion of „civil society“. Given the power on which it can draw,
the European Union can push more strongly for non-state groups to be involved. Al-
though the development of an intra-societal diversity of interests also includes the de-
velopment of groups that do not correspond with Western notions of a civil society,
Islamist movements should not be excluded from the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue.
51. Introduction and Scope*
The virtually hopeless situation in what is becoming an ever more tangled civil war in Alge-
ria, the terrorist attacks by Islamic extremists in Egypt, and the jeopardy in which the peace
process between Israel, the Palestinians, and their Arab neighbours is being placed by death-
squads and suicide attacks – all this comes together to form a picture of the Mediterranean
as a region of unrest, and of an „Islamic threat“ against which Europe needs to protect it-
self.
It is therefore not surprising that the theses put forward by the American political scientist
Samuel P. Huntington concerning a „clash of civilizations“ – which would, he claimed, take
the place of the previous confrontation between democracy and communism – should have
caused a furore.1  And soon after this, former NATO Secretary-General Willy Claes claimed
that, following the end of the East–West conflict, it was now „Islam“ that represented the
greatest danger to the West.2
Even those who refuse to be intimidated by horror scenarios are forced to acknowledge that
the Islamic world is currently going through a phase of breakneck upheavals, which are not
infrequently mirrored in inward and outward violence. Persistent shortcomings in develop-
ment, partly rooted in the Ottoman style of rule that endured until the end of the First
World War, and partly deriving from the period of colonial dependency; the unresolved
Arab–Israeli conflict; border disputes; inter-state wars; civil wars between authoritarian re-
gimes and Islamic movements or terrorist groups; a meteoric rise in population, with which
even the fastest economic growth-rates could not keep pace; the threatened development of
weapons of mass destruction – all this is perceived as making up a „Mediterranean arch of
crisis“ extending from the conflict in Western Sahara to the disputes between Turks and
Kurds, and causing turbulence that directly affects Europe.3
Against this background, at a conference of foreign ministers held in Barcelona on 27–8
November 1995, the member states of the European Union joined with all the states on the
southern edge of the Mediterranean (except Libya) and on the eastern edge (including  Jor-
                                         
* PRIF interns Frank Gukelberger, Katja Irle, and Pablo Reyes Vallet helped with earlier versions of
this Report by undertaking bibliographical searches and providing initial drafts of parts of the text.
Berthold Meyer, originally my co-author, also c ntributed a number of passages. I am very grateful
to all four colleagues for their help, but sole responsibility for the nd-result of course lies with me.
1 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, New York (Simon & Schuster), 1996.  For critical
comment,  see Harald Müller, Der Kampf der Kulturen findet nicht statt (HSFK-Standpunkte, 98/5),
Frankfurt/M., 1998, and id., Das Zusammenleben der Kulturen: Ein Gegenentwurf zu Huntington,
Frankfurt/M. (Fischer), 1998.
2 Independent, 8 Feb. 1995, quoted from Ahmed Aghrout/Martin S. Alexander, The Euro-Mediterra-
nean New Strategy and the Maghreb countries, in: European Foreign Affairs Reviews, Vol. 2, No. 3,
1997, pp. 307–28, this ref. 310.
3 By way of a historical overview, see Reinhard Schulze, Geschichte der islamischen Welt im 20.
Jahrhundert, Munich (Beck), 1994.
6dan and Palestinian representatives) in calling for the creation of a „Euro-Mediterranean
partnership“, with a view to „turning the Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, ex-
change and co-operation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity“, and to do this by „a
strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights“.4
This „Barcelona process“ consists of a form of political/security co-operation that encom-
passes: respect for human rights, democratic norms, and pluralism; the gradual introduction
of a free-trade area by the year 2010; co-operation in the social and cultural sphere.
Restriction to the Maghreb Region
This study focuses on these three „pillars“ of the Barcelona process, confining itself to rela-
tions with the Maghreb region, and again, within this category, to Tunisia, Algeria, and Mo-
rocco.5  This approach is dictated to some extent by practical considerations, but also by the
content itself.
For one thing, the „Mediterranean arch of crisis“ includes a host of very different conflicts,
each of which would require it own analysis. It is true that the European Union’s Mediter-
ranean initiative is directed at the whole region, but even the European Community (of the
Six) devoted special attention to the Maghreb. Because of colonial history and numerous
cultural links, all three Maghreb countries are very much geared to Europe. It was therefore
no coincidence that, in the run-up to the Barcelona process, the EC Commission had fo-
cused its original proposal for a Mediterranean initiative on this region.
Secondly, the Maghreb forms a distinct – albeit very loosely connected – entity amongst the
countries along the southern and eastern edges of the Mediterranean. Although the eco-
nomic, social, and political circumstances differ to such an extent that the Arab Maghreb
Union formed by Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, and Mauretania in February 1989 has
scarcely moved beyond paper declarations,6 this endeavour in itself reflects a feeling of b-
longing together and of being under pressure from the same kinds of problems. It is no ac-
cident that the word „Maghreb“ still exists today – even though, in its sense of „far West“, it
has its roots in another age, marked by different geographical-cum-political cir stances.7
The attempt to focus on relations with the Maghreb countries when analysing European
Mediterranean policy can, thirdly, only be justified on content-related grounds if there is
good reason to suppose that relations between the Maghreb countries and the EU are not
                                         
4 Abschlußerklärung der Mittelmeer-Konferenz der Europäischen Union am 27. und 28. November
1995 in Barcelona, in: Internationale P litik,Vol. 51, No. 2, 1996, pp. 107-122, this ref. 108.
5 Relations with Libya are not considered; a separate study would be needed for these.
6 On this, see Ahmed Aghrout/Keith Sutton, Regional Economic Union in the Maghreb, in: The Jour-
nal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 28, No. 1, 1990, pp. 115–39; also Eva Weidnitzer, Die Union du
Maghreb Arabe: Probleme maghrebinischer Zusammenarbeit und die Suche nach einer neuen Part-
nerschaft mit der EG (Berlin: Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik), 1992.
7 On the history of the t rm „Maghreb“, see Hartmut Kistenfeger, Maghreb-Union und Golfrat: Regi-
nale Kooperation in der arabischen Welt (Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Aus-
wärtige Politik: Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen Politik, No. 89), Bonn, Dec. 1994, pp. 16–21.
7entirely dictated by the Middle East conflict, dominating as it does the Mediterranean re-
gion. Positively speaking, numerous arguments can be cited which indicate that the suc-
cessful conclusion of the Barcelona conference in November 1995 would not have been
possible had it not been for the initiation of the peace process in the Middle East. Negatively
speaking, the meagre results of the follow-up meeting to Barcelona, in La Valletta in April
1997, were blamed on the stagnation and reverses in Arab–Israeli relations. And yet the
Barcelona process was conceived of independently of the state of the Middle East conflict;
even now, despite the crises in the Arab–Israeli peace-process, it continues to  be im-
plemented. It may therefore be assumed that it is developing a momentum of its own – as
was done by the CSCE process, which was influenced by the overall situation in East–West
relations and yet helped overcome the East–West conflict.8
Scope
The „basic philosophy“ of the Barcelona declaration is that security in the Mediterranean
region can best be ensured by the states of the region developing into democratic societies
with capitalist market economies. Euro-Mediterranean co-operation is designed to aid pro-
gress towards this goal, through financial help from the European Union, and also to absorb
the social costs. It is a combination of classic EU foreign policy, in the form of the promo-
tion of free trade, and a process of dialogue aimed at creating a communicative structure for
the regulation of political, economic, and social conflicts in the region. As a programme
also intended to promote democracy, the Barcelona process implies a change in the systems
of rule in those societies of the southern and eastern Mediterranean currently under
authoritarian control.
The present Report asks what chance this approach has of succeeding.
The first task is to establish whether the free-trade area will help bring about economic
prosperity and peace in the region. Is it not much more likely – as many fear – to widen yet
further the gap in prosperity between the northern and southern Mediterranean?  Will it
make the social upheavals in the Maghreb countries even more acute, thus giving added
succour to extremist Islamic movements which in fact ought to have the ground cut from
under their feet?
Secondly, one needs to ask whether there is, in fact, any realistic possibility at all of pro-
moting the democratization of the Maghreb countries via the Barcelona process. Can the
power-groups that dominate in the Maghreb be persuaded to effect an opening-up of their
regimes that goes beyond a mere cosmetic adjustment of the present method of exercising
power?  Where the Maghreb is concerned, is the idea of stimulating democracy from the
outside even conceivable?  Is there not a danger that free spaces created by lib ralization
and democratization will be filled by Islamic movements that threaten to call crucial ele-
ments of the Barcelona process into question?  How should the relationship of Islam, or
Islamic movements, to capitalist economic reform and Western democracy be viewed over-
all?  Can the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue between cultures and religions agreed on in Bar-
                                         
8 For a detailed account of this role of the CSCE, see Peter Schlotter, Die KSZE im Ost-West-Konflikt:
Wirkung einer internationalen Institution, Frankfurt/M. (Campus), 1998.
8celona strengthen the nascent „civil societies“ in the Maghreb and bolster internal processes
of democratization?
In short, what we have to do is find out whether the formula „free trade + democratization
= development“ is a valid one for the Maghreb.
2. Ambitious Goals, Meagre Results: The European Community’s
Mediterranean Policy up to 1995
A protocol to the 1957 Rome Treaties already makes mention of Morocco and Tunisia,
which at that time had just become independent.9  The privileged economic relations which
these two states enjoyed with France were to remain unaffected by the foundation of the
EEC. In addition, association was offered to all non-European states and regions with spe-
cial relations to an EEC member; in 1969, two partial-association agreements were con-
cluded with Tunisia and Morocco. Both states were to open up their markets to Community
exports – though they could still impose tariffs – and in return, they would be granted free
access to the markets of the Six for almost all their industrial products.
The first-generation agreements highlighted a fundamental problem in economic relations
between the states on the northern and southern edges of the Mediterranean.10 The econo-
mies of these countries continue even today to be based mainly on the export of raw materi-
als and semi-finished agricultural and mining products (minerals). From the outset, the vol-
ume of potential exports to the Community was therefore limited; what was involved was
mainly textile goods. At the same time, Morocco and Tunisia were of great interest as po-
tential markets for European products. Despite the tariffs, the industrial goods produced in
the Community had an easy time getting established, one reason being that they did not
have to face American or Asian competition and there were no domestic products able to
rival them. The problems inherent in these association agreements therefore rapidly became
apparent. They increased the asymmetry in the trade between the EEC and the Maghreb
states.11
                                         
  9 Algeria was still part of France at this time.
10 For a detailed account of what follows here, see: Ahmed Aghrout/Andrew P. Geddes, The Maghreb
and the European Union: From Development Cooperation to Partnership?, in: International P litics,
Vol. 33, No. 3, 1996, pp. 227–43; Bichara Khader, Le Partenariat euro-méditerranéen après la confé-
rence de Barcelone, Paris (L’Harmattan), 1997, pp. 27–66.
11 For a detailed account of this, see Marjorie Lister, The European Union and the South: Relations
with Developing Countries, London (R utledge), 1997, pp. 79–87; George Joffé, The European Uni-
on and the Maghreb, in: Richard Gillespie (ed.), Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 1, London (Pinter),
1994, pp. 22–45.
9The ineffectiveness of Mediterranean policy to date prompted the EC states to take a sec-
ond run at it in October 1972.12  The new „global Mediterranean policy“ embraced not only
trading relations but also economic and financial co-operation (via financial protocols), so-
cial affairs (immigrants from these states were granted privileged status in regard to social
security), political dialogue (annual meetings of a joint ministerial council, supported by a
committee at ambassadorial level and permanent representatives of the commission in the
states concerned), and scientific and technical co-operation.
However, the central feature of the „second-generation“ agreements with Tunisia, Mo-
rocco, and Algeria – which had no time-limit – continued to be trade relations. The
Maghreb states were granted free access to the European Market for their industrial goods
and also a reduction in tariffs on certain agricultural goods. These ranged from 20 per cent
to 80 per cent depending on the product.13
After several years of application of the agreements, the picture remained a sobering one. In
the area of trade relations in particular, there had been no success in tempering the huge
imbalance.14  In 1989, just under 65 per cent of exports from the Maghreb countries went to
the EC, whereas in 1990 imports from the region accounted for only just over 4 per cent of
total imports to the EC.15  Although economic developments in the EC from the mid-1980s
also had positive effects on the economies of the Maghreb – mainly thanks to the influx of
European currencies (brought about by the higher numbers of tourists and the transfers of
money from labour migrants in Europe) – this was offset by a disproportionate growth in
imports from the EC. In addition, the EC restrictions in the textile and agricultural sectors
prevented the Maghreb countries from exploiting potential production-advantages in this
area.16  The greatest shortcoming of the „global Mediterranean policy“ lay, firstly, in its in-
ability to awaken the interest of private investors in the Mediterranean area and, secondly,
in the minimal impact of EC financial support on the economic and social situation in the
region.
The southward expansion of the EC made the Maghreb’s situation even worse. Its economy
had to compete with the EC’s new southern members in the same product-range, but these
                                         
12 On what follows, see Christopher Piening, Global Europe: The European Union in World Affairs,
Boulder (Lynne Rienner), 1997, pp. 72–6.
13 See the detailed account in Bernabé López García/Jesús A. Nuñez Villaverde, Europe and the Mag-
hreb: Towards a Common Space, in: Peter Ludlow (ed.), Europe and the Mediterranean, Lon-
don/New York (Brassey’s), 1994, pp. 127–46, this ref. 133.
14 A chronic balance-of-trade ficit on the part of Morocco and Tunisia was, and continues to be, a
hallmark here. The picture is different if one takes the figures for the Maghreb as a whole (Maureta-
nia, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya). On this view, in 1989, for example, the Maghreb countries
showed a surplus in their balance of trade. This was, however, due in great part to Algerian and Li-
byan oil-exports.
15 Richard Pomfret, The European Community’s Relations with the Mediterranean Countries, in: John
Redmond (ed.), The External Relations of the European Community: The International Response to
1992, New York 1992, p. 78.
16 From 1978, they were requested „voluntarily“ to restrict heir textile exports to the EC so that Euro-
pean suppliers would be protected.
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members were superior to them in technology and productivity. Demand for many agricul-
tural and manufactured products could now be satisfied by the EC’s own production.
At the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, the Maghreb countries therefore had
plenty of reason to be dissatisfied with the results of the trade and co-operation agreements
that had been concluded up to that time.17 In addition, there was the fear that the re lization
of the internal European market, which was now clearly on the cards, would result in a
„fortress Europe“.18 The end of the East–West conflict delivered a final blow: the high lev-
els of financial support given by the European Community to the former socialist countries,
and the improved economic access which the states of eastern central Europe in particular
were accorded to the markets of the Twelve threatened to diminish the importance of the
Maghreb countries even further.
Because of the continued ineffectiveness of the EC policy, in June 1990 the Commission
unveiled a scheme for a „renovated Mediterranean policy“, which envisaged increased fi-
nancial assistance and better access to the European markets for the countries bordering the
Mediterranean. These proposals still fell within the usual well-trodden limits. It was only
with the eruption of the Gulf War in 1991, the open expressions of support for Iraq
amongst broad sections of the public in the Maghreb countries, the crisis in Algeria, and the
rapprochement between Arabs and Israelis, that the EC was moved to carry out a wholesale
reformulation of its policy.
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the European Community’s attention was initially focused
on support for the political and economic transition of its eastern neighbours and on the
deepening of its own process of integration. With this came the danger that the Maghreb
countries would be pushed even further to the periphery of European interest. Italy, Spain,
and France, in particular – those members located on the edge of the Mediterranean –
therefore sought to draw the attention of their northern partners to the problems of the
Mediterranean region.19  In so doing, they were able to link into various activities that had
gone on outside the EC framework in the 1970s and 1980s.20
This new development within the EC was the result of a revised assessment of the suscepti-
bility of the Maghreb region to crisis. The European Community’s Mediterranean policy
had, since its inception, been primarily a matter for the southern member states; but with the
process of European integration, which was increasingly making all members effectively
Mediterranean – e.g. via the Sc ngen agreement – other members too were now forced to
take a line on the problems and conflicts in this region. On top of this came the fear of the
                                         
17 See Alfred Tovias, The EU’s Mediterranean Policies under Pressure, in: Richard Gillespie (ed.),
Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 2, London (Pinter), 1996, pp. 9–25, this ref. esp. 10–18.
18 See Christopher Stevens, The Impact of Europe 1992 on the Maghreb and Sub-Saharan Africa, in:
Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 29, No. 2, 1990, pp. 217–41.
19 See Jean-François Coustillière, Une politique de l’Europe latine en Méditerranée occidentale, in:
Défense nationale, Vol. 48, No. 5, 1992, pp. 103–19.
20 A list of the various initiatives between 1979 and 1995 – e.g. the setting-up of a „Mediterranean
Forum“, the „5+5 Talks“, and initiatives on a „Conference on Security and Co-operation in the M -
diterranean Region“ (CSCM) – maybe found in Jean-Jaques Kourliansky, Les Enjeux de la Confé-
rence euro-méditerranéenne, in: Relations Internationales et Stratégiques, No. 20, 1995, p. 60.
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southern EC members that they would be politically and financially margi alized as the
eastward expansion that was now on the cards got under way. „To us, the Maghreb is what
Eastern Europe is to Germany,“ announced the then Spanish foreign minister, Javier Sola a,
in 1995.21
However many differences there were over detail, all the EU member-states were unani-
mous in their assessment of the Maghreb region’s overall proneness to conflict. The growth
in strength of Islamic fundamentalism22 since the mid-1980s, especially in Algeria, fuelled
fears of a domino-style „Islamic take-over“ and of the consequences this might have for
neighbouring EU countries in terms of mass influxes of refugees. If one disregards scenarios
envisaging an Islamic-fundamentalist Maghreb pursuing a policy of aggression extending to
the military sphere,23 military security problems in the narrower sense did not figure as a
threat to Europe24 – except in the case of Libya, which is not dealt with here.
In the unanimous view of the EU states, the key to the stabilization of the southern Mediter-
ranean region lies in the economic and social welfare of the populations of the Maghreb.25
Because the causes of political instability in the Mediterranean region are chiefly of a socio-
economic nature, the primary aim of the European Union is to close the huge gap in pros-
perity between the countries bordering the Mediterranean and the members of the EU.
Because of their geographical position, those members of the EU that border on the Medi-
terranean are naturally more affected by negative developments in the South. Over 60 per
cent of immigrants (about 6 million) in those EU countries that border on the Mediterranean
come from the Maghreb (1992 figures).26 Th  Mediterranean countries of the EU therefore
have a particular interest in seeing that stable relations are maintained in the Mediterranean
region, and they have put pressure on their northern partners to intensify Euro-Mediterra-
nean relations. In so doing, they have prevented what from their point of view is a one-sided
                                         
21 Die Zeit, 24 Nov. 1995.
22 The terms used to denote Islamic fundamentalism in the relevant itera ure vary.  It is often labelled
„political Islam“; in France, the word „intégrisme“ is used.  Here, I use the Anglo-Saxon term „Isla-
mism“ to denote a specific type of reaction to processes of modernization and globalization and to
avoid the connotation of a „return to the Middle Ages“ which attaches to the erm „fundamentalism“.
On this, see e.g. Heiner Bielefeldt/Wilhelm Heitmeyer, Introduction: Politisierte Religion in der Mo-
derne, in: id. (ed.), Politisierte Religion: Ursachen und Erscheinungsformen des modernen Funda-
mentalismus, Frankfurt/M. (Suhrkamp), 1998, pp. 11–33.
23 See Ian O. Lesser, Security in North Africa: Internal and External Challenges (Santa Monica:
Rand/Project Air Force), 1993.
24 On this, see the contributions by experts from the North African states in wuqûf, Vol. 9, 1994, Ham-
burg (edition wuqûf), 1995; also Fernando Faira/Alvaro Vasoncelos, Security in Northern Africa:
Ambiguity and Reality (WEU Institute for Security Studies: Chaillot Papers, No. 25), Paris, Sept.
1996.
25 Annette Jünemann, Demokratischer Beistand oder Angst vor dem islamischen Nachbarn? Europa
und Algerien, in: Kai Hafez (ed.), Der Islam und der Westen: Anstiftung zum Dialog, Frankfurt/M.
(Fischer), 1997, pp. 125–38, this ref. 131.
26 Daniela Neuenfeld-Zvolsky, Das Konfliktpotential im Maghreb: Der Nachbar Europas zwischen
Islamismus, Fortschritt und Migration (Konrad Adenauer Fou dation: Internal Study 101), Sankt
Augustin, 1995, p. 45.
12
EU fixation on supporting the transformation process in the former communist states of
central and eastern Europe.
3. The Barcelona Conference
The newly awakened interest of the southern EC states manifested itself initially in a com-
munication from the Commission to the Council on 29 April 1992, in which it was proposed
that relations with Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia be developed beyond existing co-opera-
tion, into a Euro-Maghreb partnership. Besides various forms of co-operation, the creation
of a free-trade area was viewed as one of the major objectives of the future Euro-Maghreb
agreement.
At the Lisbon meeting of the European Council in June 1992, the heads of state and gov-
ernment accepted most of the Commission’s proposals.27 They were subsequently extended,
stage by stage, to the whole Mediterranean.28 On 19 October 1994, the Commission finally
unveiled a scheme for a comprehensive „Euro-Mediterranean partnership“, including the
core elements of a free-trade area, and this was adopted without modification in December
1994, at the meeting of the European Council in Essen. The heads of state and government
recommended convening a European Mediterranean conference at ministerial level in the
second half of 1995, to which all the Mediterranean states concerned were to be invited.
Finally, at the European Council summit in Cannes on 25 and 26 June 1995 – after seven
months of tough negotiations between the southern and northern member-states29 – a finan-
cial-aid package of 4.685 billion ECUs, to cover the period 1995–9, was agreed for the
Mediterranean countries. This represents 70 per cent of the financial support accorded to
the central and eastern European states.
At the conference of foreign ministers in Barcelona on 27 and 28 November 1995, there
were major arguments both behind the scenes and in front of them (notably between Syria
                                         
27 On the prelude to the Barcelona c ference, see e.g. Jon Marks, High Hopes and Low Motives: The
New Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative, in: Mediterranean Politics, Vo. 1, No. 1, 1996, pp.
1–2; also Aghrout/Alexander,  (n. 2); and the contributions from an EU perspective by Eberhard
Rhein, Mit Geduld und Ausdauer zum Erfolg: Die neue Mittelmeer-Politik der Europäischen Union,
in: Internationale Politik, Vol. 51, No. 2, 1996, pp. 1–20, and id., Europe and the Mediterranean: A
Newly Emerging Geopolitical Area?, in: European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1996, pp.
79–96.
28 The arguments about the extension of the Maghreb policy approach to the whole Mediterranean re
described in Esther Ba bé/Ferran Izquierdo, Present and Future Joint Actions for the Mediterranean
Region, in: Martin Holland (ed.), Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Record and Reforms,
London (Pinter), 1997, pp. 120–35.
29 Details may be found in Rhein, op cit. (n. 27), p. 83, and in John Calabrese, Beyond Barcelona: The
Politics of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, in: European Security, Vol. 6, No. 4, 1997, pp. 86–
110. See also Georg J ffé, Europe and North Africa, in: Cambridge R view of International Affairs,
Vol. 10, No. 2, 1997, pp. 84–103.
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and Israel) about the way the Middle East conflict was to be handled in the concluding
document. The points of contention were: the mention of the right of peoples to self-
determination, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the fight against terrorism.
Only under massive pressure from the Spanish foreign minister, Javier Solana – who threat-
ened to lay the blame for the break-off of the conference at the door of the main protag-
nists in the Middle East conflict – was agreement reached on an ambitious „three-pillar“
programme.30
The goal of the first pillar is the creation of a political and security partnership. The d-
mands associated with this are: respect for human rights, democratic norms, and pluralism;
territorial integrity; peaceful dispute-settlement; joint action against terrorism and organized
crime; and support for the non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons at
international and regional level.
The second pillar deals with economic relations. The core element is the step-by-step crea-
tion of a free-trade area by the year 2010. Contractually, this will take the form of new bi-
lateral association-agreements between the EU and each of the Mediterranean countries
concerned. Intra-regional trade is also to be promoted.
The theme of the ird pillar is co-operation in the social and cultural sphere. There are to
be steps to promote dialogue and respect for cultures and religions, to combat racism and
hostility to foreigners, and to improve cultural exchange and educational and training op-
tions.
As a supplement to the declaration, the foreign ministers agreed a work programme for its
implementation. The programme includes provisions for instituting a dialogue at various
levels and for setting up a „Euro-Mediterranean Committee for the Barcelona Process“. The
committee will comprise high-ranking officials from those EU countries that make up the
troika at the time concerned, plus a representative of each of the Mediterranean partn rs. It
will meet regularly to prepare the foreign ministers’ meetings, take stock, work out how the
process is to be continued, and update the work programme.
The truly innovative part is the third pillar. The normative objective is the promotion of the
rule of law and of democracy, with the involvement of the „civil societies“ of North Af-
rica.31  For this purpose, the so-called MED programmes, already partially instituted as a
                                         
30 For a detailed account of this, see: Daniel Colard, La Conférence de Barcelone et le partenariat euro-
méditerranéen, in: Défense nationale, Vol. 52, No. 2, 1996, pp. 109–118; Esther Barbé, The Barce-
lona Conference: Launching Pad of a Process, in: Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1996, pp.
25–42; Aghrout/Alexander,  (n. 2); and Hanspeter Mattes, Die Europa-Mittelmeer-Konferenz in
Barcelona (27.–28. November 1995), in: Deutsches Orient Institut/Thomas Koszinowski/Hanspeter
Mattets (eds.), Nahost-Jahrbuch 1995, Opladen (Leske + Budrich), 1996, pp. 209–14.
31 „Civil society“ encompasses not only the activities of non-governmental organizations and associa-
tions but also the role of the state, which disposes of the monopoly on the use of force as a final ar-
gument.  See Julian Nida-Rümelin, Zur Philosophie einer globalen Zivilgesellschaft, in: Christine
Chwaszcza/Wolfgang Kersting (eds.), Politische Philosophie der international Beziehungen, Frank-
furt/M. (Suhrkamp), 1998, pp. 223–43, this ref. 224–5.
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means of promoting Euro-Mediterranean NGO networks, have been integrated into Euro-
Mediterranean co-operation.32
MED Urbs is aimed at improving the conditions of life of the urban populations and their
options for participating democratically at the local level. MED Campus promotes co-op-
eration between universities and between other institutes of higher education. MED Media
supports transnational co-operation between the media, particularly in the area of journalis-
tic training. MED Avicenna is intended to improve technical co-operation in health care and
environmental protection.
These MED programme are based on two principles: firstly, the EU Commission is able to
seek out partners directly, without going through state bodies; secondly, the partners must
come from at least three different countries, amongst which both regions (the Mediterra-
nean countries and the EU states) must be represented.
This same framework includes two further programme with special conditions. As part of
the groundwork for a „civil society“, MED Invest gives specifically targeted assistance to
small and medium-sized businesses by providing know-how and European business-contacts
and by setting up joint ventures. Under pressure from the European Parliament, the strictly
bilaterally organized MEDA Democracy was also set up. It is aimed exclusively at non-
governmental organizations, but the organizations concerned must not be under any ban
within the country in question, nor in receipt of funds from outside – a restriction pushed
through by the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries.
A total of 4.685 billion ECUs has been made available from Community budget funds for
the period 1995–9. This is supplemented by EIB credits totalling 3.395 billion ECUs and by
contributions from EU member-states. Ninety per cent of the EU budgetary aid goes into
the economic and financial co-operation; only 10 per cent is earmarked for the MED pro-
grammes involving social actors.
4. Implementation of the Barcelona Process up to Autumn 1998
The follow-up conference that took place as part of the Barcelona process in April 1997 in
La Valletta was meant to review action so far and agree further steps.33  But even in the
                                         
32 On this, see Dorothée Schmidt, Les Programmes Med: Une expérience européenne de coopération
décentralisée en Méditerranée, in: Monde arabe: Maghreb/Machrek, No. 153, July–Sept. 1996, pp.
61–8. Also Annette Jünemann, Die Mittelmeerpolitik der Europäischen Union: Demokratisierungs-
programme zwischen normativer Zielsetzung und realpolitischen Pragmatismus, in: Deutsch-Fran-
zösisches Institut (ed.), Frankreich-Jahrbuch 1997, Opladen (Leske + Budrich), 1997, pp. 93–115.
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run-up to the meeting, there had been major disagreements about how far the halting Mid-
dle East peace process should figure in the deliberations. On his arrival, the ruling chairman
of the Council and Dutch foreign minister van Mierlo announced that this was the Malta
conference, and that although the Middle East would be discussed, it would only be so to a
limited extent. Eventually, however, he had to accept that he was wrong.34  The Syria  for-
eign minister predicted that the end of the Middle East peace process would probably also
mean the collapse of the Barcelona initiative. But the attempt to uncouple the EU–Mediter-
ranean collaboration from the Middle East conflict was successful. After tough negotiations,
the participants managed to agree a joint concluding document.35  It did not contain any-
thing new; its value lies in the assertion by all twenty-seven participant countries that they
wished to continue with the Barcelona process.
By the time of an ad hoc meeting of foreign ministers in Palermo on 3 and 4 June 1998, the
„black mood of Malta“ – as the German foreign minister called it – had passed.36  T e Mid-
dle East conflict still commanded the greatest attention, but it no longer paralysed the con-
ference. 37  Clearly, all the participants were interested in investing the Barcelona process
with a dynamic of its own and not allowing it to become a hostage to the Middle East peace
process.
In the area of political relations, from 1995 a dialogue began to be instituted via regular
(approximately two-monthly) meetings between high-ranking officials.38  The basis of these
discussions is an action plan covering the following areas: strengthening of democracy, pre-
ventive diplomacy, confidence- and security-building measures, disarmament, terrorism,
organized crime.
A network of foreign-policy research-institutes (EuroMesCo) has also taken shape,39 as has
a co-operation mechanism in the field of disaster relief. At the end of 1997, a seminar was
held on the use of military forces for humanitarian purposes. Twice a year, there is an in-
formation and training seminar of several days’ duration aimed at diplomats from the
                                                                                                                     
33 See the list in: Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliame t –
Progress Report on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and Preparations for the Second Conference
of Foreign Affairs Ministers, 19. Febr. 1997; KOM (97)68.
34 On what follows here, see Frankfurter Rundschau, 16 and 17 Apr. 1997.
35 Schlußfolgerungen der zweiten Europa-Mittelmeer-Ministerkonferenz am 15. und 16. April 1997 in
Malta, in: Internationale Politik, Vol. 53, No. 1, 1998, pp. 72–7.
36 Frankfurter Rundschau, 5 J ne 1998.
37 Ad-hoc Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting, Palermo, 3–4 June 1998, concluding Statement by
Robin Cook, UK Presidency (http://www.euromed.net).
38 On the Barcelona follow-up process as a whole, see Jünemann (n. 32) and Geoffrey Edwards/Eric
Philippart, The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Fragmentation and Reconstruction, in: European
Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 2, No. 4, 1997,pp. 465–89.  Up-to-date information may also be found
at the Euromed Internet Forum (http://www.euromed.net), which is managed by the Mediterranean
Academy of Diplomatic Studies at the University of Malta (http://www.diplomacy.edu/euromed), in
close collaboration with the EU Commission.
39 The NGO network EuroMesCo has been existence since July 1996 and includes institutes from 27
nations. It concentrates on analysis of political and security issues in the Euro-Mediterranean region.
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twenty-seven partner countries. Talks on the signature of a „Euro-Mediterranean Charter
for Peace and Stability“ – a French initiative – are still under way. The charter is regarded as
a cornerstone of this „pillar“.40
The co-operation structures have as yet gone no further than an (arduous) exchange over
confidence-building; concrete agreements are still a distant prospect.41  The egular contacts
and conferences between foreign-policy institutes may, however, be a first step towards
creating „epistemic communities“ that could engage in preliminary discussion of military
issues of confidence-building and arms control and feed their ideas into the political
sphere.42
The conference process that has overseen Pillar 1 activities to date is documented in Tables
1 and 4.
Table 1: Political and Security Partnership
Activity Venue Date
Senior officials’ meeting on political and security ques-
tions Brussels 30–31.10.96
Senior officials’ meeting on political and security ques-
tions Brussels 23–24.11.96
Joint meeting of senior officials and EuroMesCo repre-
sentatives The Hague 11.3.97
Senior officials’ meeting on political and security ques-
tions The Hague 12.3.97
Senior officials’ meeting on political and security ques-
tions Malta 11.4.97
                                         
40 See Jean François Daguzan, La Méditerranée en quête d’une organisation politico-stratégique, in:
Défense nationale, Vol. 53, No. 10, 1997, pp. 14–29.
41 See Fred Tanner, The Euro-Med Partnership: Prospects for Arms Limitations and Confidence Buil-
ding after Malta, in: International Spectator, Vol. 32, No. 2, 1997, pp. 3–25.
42 The role of „epistemic communities“ in the formation of regimes, and as a source of ideas for nego-
tiating processes, has been a subject of intensive debate for some time now in international relations.
See: Peter M. Haas (ed.), Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination (spec. issue of
International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 1, winter 1992; Thomas Risse-Kappen, Ideas Do not Float
Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War, in: Richard
Ned Lebow/Thomas Risse-Kappen (eds.), International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold
War, New York (Columbia Univ. Press), 1995, pp. 187–222; Schlotter, (n. 8), pp. 57–61, 235–51.
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Activity Venue Date
Meeting of institutes of defence studies Paris 26.5.97
Senior officials’ meeting on political and security ques-
tions Brussels 3.6.97
Workshop for diplomats on cultural aspects of confi-
dence-building Cairo 14–18.6.97
Preparatory meeting for the project on prevention of
natural and man-made disasters Rome 12.9.97
Seminar of persons with political-military respon-
sibilities on the use of military forces for humanitarian
tasks Rome 1.10.97
Senior officials’ meeting on political and security ques-
tions Brussels 22.10.97
Information session for diplomats Malta 7.11.97
Senior officials’ meeting on political and security ques-
tions Brussels 25.2.98
Information session for diplomats Malta 1.5.98
Senior officials’ meeting on political and security ques-
tions Brussels 18.5.98
Ad hoc meeting of ministers of foreign affairs Palermo 27.5.98
Meeting of government experts on the Euro-
Mediterranean economic area Brussels 27.5.98
Meeting of the steering committee for the project on
prevention of natural and human catastrophesRome 2.6.98
Meeting of the steering committee for the project on
prevention of natural and human catastrophesRome 12.9.98
Senior officials’ meeting on political and security ques-
tions Brussels 14.9.98
Information session for diplomats Malta 12.11.98
Senior officials’ meeting on terrorism Brussels 23.11.98
Senior officials’ meeting on political and security ques-
tions Brussels 24.11.98
Senior officials’ meeting on the Charter for Peace and
Stability Brussels 24.11.98
Source: Compilation from http://www.euromed.net
The economic and financial co-operation has involved, amongst other things, exchanging
know-how and identifying the joint policies needed to create the Euro-Mediterranean free-
trade area. The goal is a set of agreements on shared principles in individual policy-sectors.
Rapprochement has already been achieved in the fields of industry, energy, water manage-
ment, the information society (telecommunications), tourism, fishing, and maritime trans-
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port. The MEDSTAT programme, with a budget of 20 million ECUs, aims to harmonize
statistics in the partner countries over a period of four years.
In addition, meetings are taking place between economic institutes, industrial organizations,
trade unions, chambers of commerce and industry, and organiz tions promoting interna-
tional trade or working in the banking sector (this includes private as well as central banks).
Funds from the EU budget and also EIB credits have been used to facilitate the administra-
tive and economic adjustment needed for the planned free-trade area. With the monies re-
ceived, Morocco instituted a taxation and banking reform and made investments in the
training and health sectors and in water supply. Algeria used the financial aid to liberalize
agriculture and to introduce privatization into the housing market. (For the meetings over-
seeing Pillar 2 activities, see Table 2.)
Table 2: Economic and Financial Partnership
Activity Venue Date
Workshop on research Sofia Antipolis 1–2.4.96
Workshop on education and training Brussels 2–3.5.96
2nd meeting of the monitoring committee on science and
technology Capri 2–3.5.96
Workshop on regulatory framework Palermo 6–7.5.96
Ministerial conference on tourism Naples 10–11.5.96
Industrial federations’ conference Malta 13–14.5.96
Meeting of industry ministers Brussels 20–21.5.96
Meeting in margins of Solar Summit Malta 22.5.96
Ministerial conference on information society Rome 30–13.5.96
Workshop on SMEs Milan 4–5.6.96
Expert meeting on the protection of wetlands in the
Mediterranean Venice 5–6.6.96
Seminar of directors-general of statistics and regional
programme for co-operation in statistics Naples 18–20.6.96
Working group on service centres and industrial zonesRome 24–25.6.96
Conference on MARIS Malta 7.6.96
Conference of energy ministers Trieste 7–9.96
Preparatory expert meeting on the management of fish-
stocks in the Mediterranean Brussels 4–5.7.96
Meeting of experts on the implementation of the multi-
annual programme on maritime transport in the Med-
terranean Cyprus 14–15.10.96
Meeting on the European energy charter Brussels 21–22.11.96
Activity Venue Date
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Conference on local water-management Marseilles 25–26.11.96
2nd diplomatic conference on the management of fish-
stocks in the Mediterranean Venice 27–29.11.96
3rd meeting of the monitoring committee on science and
technology Cyprus 12–13.12.96
Conference on private investments London 6–7.3.97
Expert meeting on economic transition Brussels 20.3.97
Follow-up meeting of industry ministers’ working group
Brussels 24.3.97
First meeting of the Euro-Mediterranean energy forumBrussels 13.5.97
Workshop on space applications in the Euro-
Mediterranean region Cairo 26.5.97
4th meeting of the monitoring committee Enkhuizen 10.6.97
Seminar on co-operation in statistics (MEDSTAT)Malta 24.6.97
Euro-Mediterranean seminar on co-operation in statis-
tics Tunis 26.6.97
Meeting of the correspondents in charge of the short-
and medium-term priority environmental action pro-
gramme Brussels 17.6.97
Follow-up to the meeting of industry ministers: working
group Athens 1.9.97
Meeting of the directors-general of industry in prepara-
tion for the 2nd conference of industry ministersPalermo 1.9.97
Preparatory meeting for the ministerial conference on
environment Madrid 23.9.97
Meeting of the directors-general of industry in prepara-
tion for the 2nd conference of industry ministersPalermo 1.10.97
Forum on the information society Athens 1.10.97
3rd Euro-Mediterranean conference of industrial asso-
ciations Athens 6.10.97
Follow-up meeting of industry ministers: working group
Palermo 13.10.97
Meeting of the directors-general of industry in prepara-
tion for the 2nd conference of industry ministersPalermo 13.10.97
Meeting of NGOs on environment Montpellier 16.10.97
2nd Euro-Mediterranean ministerial conference on in-
dustrial co-operation Marrakesh 30.10.97
Preparatory meeting for the ministerial conference on
environment Helsinki 26.11.97
Meeting of NGOs on environment Helsinki 27.11.97
Activity Venue Date
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Ministerial conference on environment Helsinki 28.11.97
Meeting of directors-general of water, on the Euro-
Mediterranean information system on know-how in the
field of water (SEMIDE) Naples 9–10.12.97
Euro-Med Net 98 Cyprus 4.3.98
Euro-Mediterranean Conference on capital marke s London 26.3.98
Meeting of the Euro-Mediterranean energy forum at the
level of directors-general Malta 15.4.98
Meeting of government experts on the Euro-
Mediterranean economic area Brussels 27.4.98
Euro-Mediterranean conference of energy
ministers Brussels 11.5.98
Euro-Mediterranean RTD co-operation: 5th monitoring
committee meeting Malta 24.5.98
Policies and business strategies conference for Euro-
Mediterranean information society Istanbul 15.6.98
Workshop for the gradual establishment of a network of
technology innovation poles in the Euro-Mediterranean
region Brindisi 22.6.98
Euro-Mediterranean forum on co-operation in agricul-
ture and agro-industry Naples 8.7.98
Follow-up meeting of industry ministers: working group
– legal and administrative economic and financial part-
nership framework Brussels 10.7.98
Euro-Mediterranean forum on co-operation in agricul-
ture and agro-industry Capri 21.9.98
2nd Euro-Mediterranean ministerial conference of in-
dustrial co-operation Klagenfurt 3.10.98
Euro-Mediterranean forum on consumer policyBari 8.10.98
Seminar on the armonization of standards Berlin 26.10.98
2nd directors’ committee meeting of MEDSTATMalta 28.10.98
Euro-Mediterranean conference on the promotion of
women’s participation in economic and social lifeLisbon 16.11.98
Meeting of correspondents on the short- and medium-
term priority action programme for the environm t Brussels 17.11.98
Source: Compilation from http://www.euromed.net
In the area of social and cultural co-operation, there have been several meetings on the
preservation of cultural heritage, leading on to joint projects.43 In addition, there have been
                                         
43 See also Elena Maria Peresso, Euro-Mediterranean Cultural Cooperation, in: European Foreign
Affairs Review, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1998, pp. 135–56.
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conferences on Islam and on relations between the Islamic world and Europe, on the prob-
lem of drug trafficking and organized crime, on government in the Euro-Mediterranean re-
gion, on social aspects (e.g. health and education), and on human rights. These were at-
tended in each case by government representatives and academics from the individual
countries (most of the academics were there as speakers). Some of the results of these kinds
of meetings are fed into the plans for new projects within the framework of the MED pro-
gramme (see Table 3).
The Barcelona declaration stipulated that co-operation with non-governmental organiza-
tions, and also dialogue between the different religions, must remain „within the framework
of national laws“. This precludes any institutionalized contact with, for example, Islamist
groups. In practice, this means that so far only organizations that are backed, or at least
tolerated, by the state have ultimately been brought into the MED pr grammes, and have
been brought in politically anodyne areas.
Table 3: Social, Cultural, and Human Affairs
Activity Venue Date
Workshop on the conservation of cultural heri age Arles 9–10.2.96
Workshop on the access to cultural heritage Berlin 23–24.2.96
Workshop on heritage as a factor in sustainable devel-
opment Amman 22–23.3.96
Ministerial conference on cultural heritage Bologna 22–23.4.96
Tripartite conference on the Euro-Mediterranean social
area Catania 24–25.5.96
Conference on relations between the Islamic world and
Europe Amman 10–13.6.96
Conference on contemporary Islam Copenhagen 17–18.6.96
Officials’ meeting on drug-trafficking and organized
crime Taormina 11–12.6.96
Conference on governance in the Euro-Mediterranean
region The Hague 17.3.97
Preparatory meeting on the high-level meeting on TV
and audio-visual co-operation Rome 6.10.97
Conference on the Euro-Mediterranean audio-visual and
cinematographic heritage Sitges 9.10.97
Expert meeting on health and social welfare The Hague 9.12.97
Euro-Mediterranean conference on mutual perceptions
in the field of education Luxembourg 3.11.97
Activity Venue Date
High-level meeting on TV and audio-visual co-
operation Thessaloniki 15.11.97
Workshop on dialogue between cultures and civili-
zations Stockholm 23.4.98
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Euro-Mediterranean conference on strengthening de-
mocracy and respect for human rights London 10.5.98
Training seminar in the field of police co-operationR me 1.6.98
Informal follow-up meeting on health and social protec-
tion Amsterdam 22.9.98
2nd Euro-Mediterranean conference of culture ministers
Rhodes 25–26.9.98
Training seminar in the field of police co-operati n:
„The Fight against Organized Crime“ Rome 12.10.98
Source: Compilation from http://www.euromed.net
Up to now, the EU has not applied the system of conditions detailed in the second pillar and
the association agreements. Thus, the negotiations with Algeria were begun before the
presidential elections had taken place; and the country was supplied with generous credits
despite the fact that the internal political situation fell far short of the stipulated human-
rights standards (not just because of Islamist terrorist groups). Another reason for the
bluntness of the conditions instrument is that – under pressure from the British government
– decisions here can at present only be reached on a consensus basis. This makes it easier
for recipient countries to water down conditions, because in most cases they can rely on a
veto from one of the „protective powers“ of Europe.44
Taking interim stock, one can say that, although co-operation in the second pillar is diffi-
cult, all in all it proceeds relatively smoothly – because no arguments about forms of gov-
ernment or differing values are involved. The main problems currently lie in the field of hu-
man rights, democratization, and contact between the different „civil societies“. Here, the
structure of the ruling regimes in the Maghreb is affected; here, they seek to block or con-
trol the process of dialogue.
Table 4: Other Activities
Activity Venue Date
Information session for diplomats Malta 28.9–6.10.96
                                         
44 See Laura Feliu, The European Union as aMediterranean Actor, in: Rodolfo Ragioneri (ed.), Politica
ed economica nell’area mediterranea, Quaderni Forum, Vol. 11, No. 2, 1997, pp. 21–39, this ref. 32–
6.
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Forum BEI ’96: „The Mediterranean: A Space for a
Partnership“ Madrid 24–25.10.96
Euro-Mediterranean summit of the industrial fed-
erations Casablanca 5–6.12.96
Workshop on contracting services in the Mediterranean
Istanbul 17–18.10.96
Euro-Med information and training programme for
diplomats Malta 15.3.97
Meeting of economic institutes Marseilles 24.3.97
Expert seminar on trade fairs as a motor of econ mic
development Lisbon 26.5.97
Meeting of international trade-promotion organzations Palermo 29.5.97
Congress on environmental policy and law in the Med-
terranean Cyprus 25.6.97
EuroMeSco annual conference Tunis 29.9–1.10.96
Euro-Mediterranean seminar of chambers of commerce
and industry Malta 29.10.97
3rd Euro-Mediterranean seminar of economic and so-
cial committees and similar institutions Casablanca 27.11.97
Meeting of working groups of EuroMeSco network Lisbon 30.3.98
Annual EuroMeSco conference London 15–18.5.98
Preparatory meeting of the Euro-Mediterranean parlia-
mentary forum Malta 25.5.98
4th Euro-Mediterranean summit of economic and social
councils Lisbon 24.9.98
Euro-Mediterranean parliamentary forum Brussels 27.10.98
Source: Compilation from http://www.euromed.net
5. The Political and Economic Situation in the Maghreb Countries
In order to be able to assess what prospects the Barcelona process – with its „free trade +
democratization = development“ formula – has of succeeding in the Maghreb countries, a
short account needs to be given of the economic and social situation in the region.
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5.1 Algeria
Of the three Maghreb countries, Algeria is the one most strongly marked by its colonial
past. Whereas Morocco and Tunisia became independent in the mid-1950s without armed
conflict, Algeria only wrested its independence from France after a bloody war that cost one
million of the then total of 9 million inhabitants their lives.
This experience with the French „motherland“ influenced the post-colonial period more than
almost any other factor.45  The desire of the Front National de Libération (FNL) to develop
a national identity manifested itself in the slogan „Algeria is our fatherland, Arabic our lan-
guage, Islam our religion.“46  Whereas at the time of liberation from colonialism, Islam was
a major identity-forming element, Algeria’s FNL governments soon distanced themselves
from it and championed an Algerian-style socialism.47
The Algerian economy is founded on oil and gas reserves. Algeria is a typical monostruc-
tural „rentier state“, in which an authoritarian ruling bureaucracy lives off the income from
the production of mineral or agricultural raw materials, needing to make only minimal in-
puts of investment and labour.48  During the 1980s, however, Algeria’s r ntier economy
collapsed, when the dramatic fall in oil-prices caused a drastic reduction in the returns of the
ruling government-classes and their clientèle, with consequent social unrest.
When, in the mid-1980s, „Algerian socialism“ – and with it the FNL regime – hit economic
and social rock-bottom, the Islamists played a major role in the protests of the time, which
culminated in civil-war-like unrest (in October 1988).49 They had won credibility and politi-
cal scope for themselves with their criticism of the corrupt system of rule. Although their
social and religious activities („wild mosques“, etc.) were often illegal, the regime had toler-
ated them in the hope of being able to exploit them to counter the growing influence of the
secular, Berber, and trade-union opposition.50
The Algerian regime reacted to the country-wide protests of 1988 by liberalizing the econ-
omy (cutting back the public sector) and opening up the political system. The new constitu-
                                         
45 Werner Ruf, Die algerische Tragödie: Vom Zerbrechen des Staates einer zerissen n Gesellschaft,
Münster (agenda Verlag), 1997), esp. p. 12 following pages.
46 On this, see Algérie: l’arabisation, lieu de conflits multiples, in: Monde arabe: Maghreb/Machrek,
No. 150, Oct.–Dec. 1995, pp. 57–71.
47 Shireen T. Hunter, The Algerian Crisis: Origins, Evolution and Lessons for the Mghreb and Europe
(Centre for European Political Studies), Brussels, 1996, p. 20.
48 On this, see Claudia Schmid, Das Konzept des Rentier-Staates: Ein sozialwissenschaftliches Para-
digma zur Analyse von Entwicklungsgesellschaften und seine Bedeutung für den Vorderen Orient,
Münster (LIT Verlag), 1991; Peter Pawelka, Staat, Bürgertum und Rente im arabischen Vorderen
Orient, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B. 39/97, 19 Sept. 1997, pp. 3–11.
49 For a detailed account of this, see Brahim Younessi, L’Islamisme algérien: nébuleuse ou movement
social?, in: Politique étrangère, Vol. 60, No. 2, 1995, pp. 363–76.
50 On this, see Hugh Roberts, From Radical Mission to Equivocal Ambition: The Expansion and Mani-
pulation of Algerian Islamism, 1979–1992, in: Martin E. Marty/R. Scott Appleby (eds.), Accounting
for Fundamentalism: The Dynamic Character of Movements, Chicago (Univ. of Chicago Press),
1994, pp. 428–89.
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tion of February 1989 made the one-party system accessible to other, previously illegal,
parties. The intention was to establish a system which, on the one hand, went some way to
meeting the demands of the liberal forces in economics and politics, and, on the other,
aimed to create a basis for necessary economic reforms.51
The FIS (Front Islamique du Salut), which, since its foundation in 1989, had quickly won
broad support amongst the population, established itself as the FNL’s strongest rival.52
When, during the first free parliamentary elections in December 1991, it began to become
clear that the Front was going to win, the military intervened and prevented the second
ballot.53
The suppression of Islamism after the election victory of 1991, and the disappearance of the
FIS underground, increased the divide between moderate and militant groups. Whereas one
side continued to pursue the non-violent path to political participation,54 the other side be-
gan a radical campaign against the regime, splitting first into the „Groupesislamiques ar-
més“ (GIA) and the „Armée islamique du salut“ (AIS), and later into further militant
groups.55
The Algerian military’s actions against the terrorists probably claim many victims amongst
civilians and people who are not involved. The war has become increasingly individul-
ized;56 some sections of the state and secret-service apparatus participate in the acts of ter-
ror as „death-squads“.57
                                         
51 Sigrid Faath, Probleme der Demokratisierung in den Maghrebstaaten, in: Aus Politik und Zeitge-
schichte, B 44–45/95, 27 Oct. 1995, pp. 14–23, this ref. 18.
52 Meriem Vergès, Genesis of a Mobilization: The Young Activists of Algeria’s Islamic Salvation
Front, in: Joel Beinin/Joe Stork (eds.), Political Islam: Essays from Middle East Report, Berkeley
(Univ. of California Press), 1997, pp. 292–305.
53 See Ulrike Borchardt, Algeriens „Gleis der Demokratie“, in: Blätter für deutsche und internationale
Politik, Vol. 42, No. 9, Sept. 1997, pp. 1094–1103.
54 Large numbers of Islamists moved to the government camp.  See Lahouari Addi, Algeria’s Tragic
Contradictions, in: Journal of Democracy,  Vol. 7, No. 3, 1996, pp. 94–107.
55 See the description of individual Islamist groups in Algeria in John P. Entelis, Political Islam in the
Maghreb: the Nonviolent Dimension, in: id. (ed.), Islam, Democracy, and the State in North Africa,
Bloomington/Indianapolis (Indiana Univ. Press), 1997, pp. 44–74, this ref. 57–71.
56 More and more people in Algeria are „coming to depend for their existence on commerce with cer-
tain death“.  Boys and young men are recruited by soldiers or rebels and paid for their services.
200,000 government-sponsored village-watchmen and countless elf-defence committees have set
themselves the ask of stemming violence with violence (Frankfurter Rundschau, 23 Jan. 1997).
57 For a detailed account of this, see Werner Ruf, Gewalt und Gegengewalt in Algerien, in: Bielefeldt/
Heitmeyer (n. 22), pp. 320–36; id., Algerien zwischen westlicher Demokratie und Fundamentalis-
mus?, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B 21/98, 15 May 1998, pp. 27–38; id., Algerien: Islamis-
mus gegen Demokratie?, in: Reinhard Mutz/Bruno Schoch/Friedhelm Solms (eds.), Friedensgutach-
ten 1998, Münster (LIT-Verlag), 1998, pp. 75–87; and Lahouari Addi, Algeria’s Army, Algeria’s
Agony, in: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 4, July–Aug. 1998, pp. 44–53.
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Domestically, the government has bunkered itself into the cycle of violence,58 brusquely
rejecting any outside offer to mediate in the civil war as „colonial interference“.59  Th e is
an endless spiral of violence, which, according to conservative estimates, has cost 65, 000
lives since 1991.60
The liberalization instituted by the FNL regime at the end of the 1980s led to a mushroom-
ing of citizens’ initiatives, professional associations, human-rights groups, women’s groups,
and other social groupings.61  Despite the ruthless terrorism of extremist groups, and the
violence of the state, it seems – as far as one can judge, given press censorship – that moves
to set up non-governmental groups are still going on, not just amongst the I lamists.62
Over 60 per cent of Algerian exports of natural gas go to Europe; over 65 per cent of its
exports come from the European Union. Thanks to its exports of natural gas, Algeria’s ba-
ance of trade with the EU is in the black.63  As well as the natural-gas pipeline extending
(via Tunisia and the Mediterranean) to Italy, since winter 1996 there has also been a pipe-
line taking natural gas from Algeria to Spain and Portugal via Morocco.64  Ninety-eight per
cent of the national budget derives from the export of hydrocarbons; at the same time, 80
per cent of basic foodstuffs have to be imported.65  Accor ing to estimates by economic
                                         
58 How far the ceasefire between the military arm of the FIS (the AIS) and the army/government will
hold, and how far it will lead to initiation of an internal political dialogue, is currently unclear.  For
a positive assessment, see Luis Martinez, Algérie: les enjeux des négociations entre l’AIS et l’armée,
in: Politique étrangère, Vol. 62, No. 4, winter 1997–8, pp. 499–510.
59 Benjamin Stora, Ce que dévoile une guerre: Algérie 1997, in: Politique étrangère, Vol. 62, No. 4,
winter 1997–8, pp. 487–97.
60 Frankfurter Rundschau, 23 May 1998, p. 2.
61 John P. Entelis, Civil Society and the Authoritarian Temptation in Algerian Politics: Islamic De-
mocracy vs. the C ntralized State, in: Augustus Richard Norton (ed.), Civil Society in the Middle
East, Vol. 2, Leiden (E. J. Brill), 1996, pp. 45–86.
62 Dirk Vandewalle, Islam in Algeria: Religion, Culture, and Opposition in a Rentier State, in: John L.
Esposito (ed.), Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism, or Reform?, Boulder (Lynne Rienner), 1997,
pp. 33–51.  See also the cautiously optimistic assessment in William B. Quandt, Between Ballots and
Bullets: Algeria’s Transition from Authoritarianism, Washington D.C. (Brookings), 1998. Despite
all the violence, Quandt regards Algeria as being on the path to political pluralism, embracing mode-
rate Islamists as it goes.
63 See the detailed information about the Algerian economy in Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Guide
for Investors in Algeria. Prepared for the European Commission by GMA Capital Markets Ltd.,
Brussels, 1997 (http://www.euromed.net).
64 On this, see Francis Ghilés, España y el gas argelino, in: Política Exterior, Vol. 9, No. 44, 1995, pp.
169–76.
65 Werner Ruf, Drohen die Spannungen, die Algerien erschüttern, auch den übrigen Maghrebstaaten,
in: Berthold Meyer (ed.), Unruhezone Mittelmeer: Westeuropa und seine südlichen Nachbarn,
Frankfurt/M. (HSFK), 1996, p. 126.
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experts, by 1998,  production of oil and natural gas will already have fallen below the level
needed to offset a rise in Algeria’s – already high – foreign debts.66
Because of the precarious internal political situation, amidst which the military and the gov-
ernment portray themselves as „saviours of democracy“ but are primarily concerned to pre-
serve the power of the old governing classes, there is a desire, on the Algerian side, for in-
ternational recognition, and also a strong economic interest in co-operation with the EU.
On top of this, the regime seeks to make utilize the Union in its quest to maintain power.
Algerian policy vis-à-vis the Union has its sights set, first and foremost, on the economic
benefits that it hopes to gain from a Euro-Mediterranean partnership, and also on improve-
ments in military and secret-service co-operation, which would enable it to act more effec-
tively against militant Islamic groups and other opposition forces. Algeria’s government has
no obvious interest in making any reciprocal move to improve respect for human rights and
political freedoms. Of all the Maghreb countries, it is Algeria that will present the greatest
economic and political obstacles to the implementation of the Barcelona process.67
5.2 Tunisia
Of the three Maghreb countries, Tunisia is the one that most nearly corresponds to Western
notions of a modernizing state. Since General Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali deposed the coun-
try’s aged founder, Habib Bourgiba, in a bloodless take-over in 1987, on grounds of the
latter’s „infirmity“, the government has sought to modernize what had, up to then, been an
extremely unhealthy national economy. The main plank on which the president is relying is
economic development, to be stimulated by privatization (with a view to a complete with-
drawal of the state from the economy), the creation of a free-trade area, and the enlistment
of foreign investors.68
With the help of the IMF/World Bank structural adjustment programme which has been in
operation since 1986, Tunisia has managed to reduce its debts.69  Since 1995, a free-trade
agreement with the EU has been in force. In 1996, despite high unemployment,70 Tunisia
had a per capita income of $US4,960, which means that, to this extent, it ranks amongst the
                                         
66 See also Caroline Ardouin, Économie algérienne: quelles perspectives, Monde arabe: Mag-
hreb/Machrek, No. 149, July–Sept. 1995, pp. 13–22; and Ghazi Hidouci, L’Algérie peut-elle sortir
de la crise?, ibid., pp. 24–34.
67 On this assessment, see also Volker Perthes/Heidi Kübel, Sozioökonomische und politische Herau-
forderungen im südlichen Mittelmeerraum: Eine Bestandsaufnahme (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Po-
litik: SWP-AP 3048), Ebenhausen, Nov. 1997.
68 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), 18 Apr. 1997.
69 For a detailed account of the economic situation, see Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Guide for
Investors in Tunisia. Prepared for the European Commission by Maxwell Stamp plc, Brussels, Feb.
1997.
70 The official figure is 16%; Daniela Neuenfeld-Zvolsky (op. cit., p. 34, n. 26 above) thinks 25%–30%
is more likely.
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medium-income countries.71  Its social structure is more balanced than that of its neigh-
bours. This has to do not least with the country’s very prominent tourist sector, which is
constantly being expanded and which not only guarantees a large number of (service-based)
jobs in the hotel and catering industry, but is also crucial to the craft and small-scale trade
sectors.72
Tunisian foreign policy has thus been placed entirely at the service of the economy over the
last few years. The government see co-operation with the EU as offering an opportunity to
combat poverty and push ahead with modernization.
The project of a secular state has been part of these efforts at mod rnization right from the
time of independence. As early as the end of the 1960s, this prompted the emergence of an
Islamist movement, but one whose chief concern was moral renewal. In the social protests
of the 1980s, however, the Islamists occupied an increasingly prominent position. After
1987, Ben Ali sought to counter this by proclaiming „change in continuity“ and by portray-
ing the state as the sole defender of Islam through symbolic measures such as the broad-
casting of the call to prayer on radio and television. The Islamists were called upon to re-
ciprocate by showing political restraint.73
The system of rule in Tunisia is not a dictatorship, but a typically semi-authoritarian re-
gime.74  Although the country officially has a multi-party system, the presidential party
regularly obtains more than 95 per cent of the vote in general elections.75  The gover ment
co-opts moderate opposition-parties into (joint) political decision-making. Both the West-
ern and the Islamic opposition are subject to massive secret-service surveillance and police
repression. Thousands of their members are reputed to be in detention.76
Amongst the anti-Islamist measures was the educational reform of 1989. This not only pro-
vides the country’s young people with as good an education as possible up to the age of 16,
via free, compulsory schooling; it also keeps them for longer under state control – thus
warding off Islamist attempts to influence them.77
                                         
71 According to World Bank figures, this puts it ahead of Turkey ($US4,160); see FAZ, 8 Nov. 1997.
72 Total income from tourism in 1996 was $US1.35 billion; see Nahost-Jahrbuch 1996, Opladen (Leske
+ Budrich), 1997, pp. 169–71.
73 On the special features of development in Tunisia, see Mark Gasiorowski, The Failure of Reform in
Tunisia, in: Journal of Democracy, Vol. 3, No. 4, Oct. 1992, pp. 85–97, and Nicole Grimaud, La
Spécificité tunésienne en question, in: Politique Étrangère, Vol. 60, No. 2, autumn 1995, pp. 389–
402.
74 For a description of regimes of this type, see Thomas Carothers, Democracy without Illusions, in:
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 1, Jan.–Feb 1997, pp. 83–99.
75 FAZ, 8 Nov. 1997.
76 See Hamed Ibrahimi, Les Libertés envolées de la Tunisie, in: Le Monde Diplomatique, Vol. 44, No.
515, Feb. 1997, p. 4 following pages, and Susan Waltz, The Politics of Human Rights in the Mag-
hreb, Entelis (n. 55), pp. 75–92.
77 For a detailed account of this, see Michel Cannu, D’une République à l’autre: Refondation politique
et aléas de la transition libérale, in: Monde arabe: Maghreb/Machrek, No. 147, July–Sept., 1997, pp.
3–16.
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In Tunisia, even after the liberalization and democratization process was halted, a whole
variety of associations – some more, some less independent of the state – continued to ex-
ist.78  The country has a relatively well-educated middle class and a growing class of private
entrepreneurs and self-employed workers.
The hallmarks of the Tunisian situation are: a social and educational policy which, overall, is
relatively successful (notably in regard to the advancement of women); an economy that is
very much at the mercy of fluctuations in the tourist industry; and an authoritarian political
regime that is averse even to a controlled opening-up and pluralization.
5.3 Morocco
Morocco is a monarchy incorporating elements of absolutism and constitutionalism, both
principles being embodied in King Hassan II. As a descendant of the Prophet, the „Com-
mander of the Faithful“ (Art. 19 of the 1992 constitution, drawn up with the king himself in
mind) has made religion his very own personal concern; as the modernizer of his country, he
is dependent on co-operation with the West and, not least for this reason, promotes the par-
liamentarization of politics and the denationalization of the Moroccan economy.79
Because of Hassan II’s high-profile religious position, Islamism does not – unlike in Tunisia
and Algeria – pose any real threat to the political system. Although the economic crisis of
the 1980s produced unrest and social tensions in Morocco as well, here it was primarily
trade unions and universities who were the agents of protest – though Islamists did also
take part. As the political and spiritual head of his country, Hassan II has so far managed,
by working on a principle of „divide and rule“, to retain the loyalty of the Islamic clergy and
at the same time keep them under control.80
In contrast to the situation in, say, Algeria, where the FIS was in a position to link religious
centres in the larger towns into a broad network, Hassan II by exercising rigorous control
over mosques and preachers, has managed to counter Islamist attempts to break the mon-
arch’s religious monopoly by creating autonomous religious areas.81
                                         
78 See Eva Bellin, Civil Society in Formation: Tunisia, in: Augustus Richard Norton (ed.), Civil Society
in the Middle East, Vol. 1, Leiden (E. J. Brill), 1995, pp. 120–47.  See also the report by the former
president of the Tunisian Society for Human Rights Moncef El Marzouqui, Human Rights Orga-
nizations: The Difficult Task? – The Tunisian Experience, in: Bahey El Din Hassan (ed.), Challen-
ges Facing the Arab Human Rights Movements, Cairo (Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies),
n.d., 1997, pp. 115–31. The report highlights how this organization was crushed between the two
forces of state repression and political fragmentation.
79 See Cameron Khosrowshahi, Privatization in Morocco: The Politics of Development, in: Middle East
Journal, Vol. 51, No. 2, spring 1997, pp. 242–55.
80 On what follows here, see Sigrid Faath, Rechte und Freiheiten der Staatsbürger im „Hassanismus“,
in: ead./Hanspeter Mattes (ed .), Demokratie und Menschenrechte in Nordafrika, Hamburg (edition
wuqûf), 1992, pp. 367–433.
81 Abderrahim Lamchichi, L’Islamisme s’enracine au Maroc, in: Le Monde Diplomatique, No. 506,
May 1996, pp. 10–11. See also Entelis (n. 55), 50–6.
30
In 1983, Morocco began to introduce structural adjustment programmes, and these
prompted mass rallies, trade-union-organized strikes, and protests by I lamist groups. Has-
san responded with a cautious opening-up of the regime; political parties and interest
groups were brought in more frequently in a consultative capacity and were made part of an
institutionalized system of conflict management.82  The controlled democratization of the
country (referendum on the creation of a directly elected chamber in September 1996,83
renewal of local and regional councils and professional bodies, free and „transparent“ elec-
tions to the first chamber on 14 November 199784) is also part of the attempt to avoid the
kind of political crisis being experienced in neighbouring Algeria.85  The prime minister has
recently begun to be drawn from the ranks of the opposition.
Morocco’s sovereign has always been, and still is, concerned to maintain good relations
with the Western industrial states. As part of the planned Euro-Mediterranean partnership,
Morocco has asked the EU for, amongst other things, assistance with the fight against the
drugs trade and illegal emigration. Since 1993, one billion US dollars have been channelled
from Europe to northern Morocco for this purpose.
The interests of the Moroccan government – like those of the other Maghreb countries –
are therefore focused mainly on EU help with economic development.86 Given the authori-
tarian-cum-liberal, semi-democratic nature of the monarchical regime, this help benefits not
only a ruling clique, but also an evolving middle class not dependent on state subsidies. The
Moroccan government is therefore open to the idea of a cautious extension of political par-
ticipation, but wishes to keep this under strict control. This is also true of the officially in-
dependent human-rights associations, professional associations, and other non-governmen-
tal organizations, the extent of whose autonomy is difficult to assess.87 Of the three
Maghreb countries, Morocco has the system of rule most open to further cautious internal
political liberalization.
                                         
82 On this, see the overview in Omar Bendourou, Power and Opposition in Morocco, in: Journal of
Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 3 July 1996, pp. 108–22.
83 See Gregory White, The Advent of Electoral Democracy in Morocco? The Referendum of 1996, in:
Middle East Journal, Vol. 51, No. 3, summer 1997, pp. 389–404.
84 See FAZ, 14 Nov. 1997, 15 Nov. 1997, 20 Nov. 1997. The transparency of these first free elections
was symbolized in the use of ballot boxes made of Perspex. 3,319 candidates from 16 parties compe-
ted for the 325 seats.  However, the power of the Moroccan parliament is not such that it can itself
appoint the government. This continues to be the prerogative of the king.
85 On this, see Abderrahim Hafdi, Islamisme algérien et champ politico-religieux au Maroc, in: Poli-
tique étrangère, Vol. 60, No. 2, autumn 1995, pp. 377–87.
86 On this, see Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Guide for Investors in Algeria. Prepared for the Euro-
pean Commission by GMA Capital Markets Ltd., Brussels, 1997.
87 See Guilain Denoeux/Laurent Gateau, L’Essor des associations au Maroc: à la recherche de la citoy-
enneté, in: Monde arabe: Maghreb/Machrek, No. 150, Oct.–Dec. 1995, pp. 19–56.
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6. Problems Facing the Euro-Mediterranean Free-Trade Area in the
Maghreb Countries
The introduction of a free-trade area will be an acid test for economy and society in the
Maghreb countries. If the present rate of growth in population continues (there has already
been some success in reducing it through the use of contraceptives), the population in all
three countries will have practically doubled by the year 2005.88  According to World Bank
calculations, real growth of 5 per cent is needed over the next few years to supply the needs
of the expanding population and at the same time to increase living standards and per-capita
income by about 2.5 per cent.89
Overall, relations between Europe and the Maghreb are marked by profound economic and
social asymmetries. Trade with the Maghreb countries accounts for no more than 2.4 per
cent of the total value of EU trade, whereas 60 per cent of the these countries’ exports, and
65 per cent of their imports, are effected with the EU. In 1993, Gross National Product in
the Maghreb was 1.2 per cent that of the EU countries.90  A major obstacle to economic
modernization is the high foreign indebtedness of the three countries.91
The authoritarian character of the political regimes – indeed, what often amounts to „bad
governance“, especially in Algeria – is combined with an étatiste conomic system that has
undergone rudimentary liberalization – with Algeria bringing up the rear in this area too.
Reforms frequently come to a halt because a change in the economic étatisme w uld also
bring the disintegration of the client system associated with it.92  The pressure for an ope-
ing-up, for liberalization and democratization, that became evident at the end of the 1980s,
with the advent of the social changes, was either channelled off peacefully in a policy of
„maintaining the system through controlled opening-up“,93 or else was quelled with varying
degrees of repression, as in Tunisia and – most brutally – Algeria. Even where elections
could be regarded as free and fair, they have remained „ballots with no option of a change in
power“.94  Turn-out is frequently used as proof of legitimacy.95
                                         
88 George Joffé (n. 11), p. 34.
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90 Aghrout/Geddes (n. 10), p. 229.
91 Thus in 1994, according to World Bank figures, Algeria’s foreign debt stood at $US29.898 billion,
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12–29, this ref. 23.
92 For a detailed account of this, see John Waterbury, From Social Contracts to Extraction Contracts:
The Political Economy of Authoritarianism and Democracy, in: Entelis (n. 55), pp. 141–76, and
Clement  M. Henry, Crisis of Money and Power: Transitions to Democracy?, ibid., pp. 177–204.
93 Perthes/Kübel (n. 67), p. 34.
94 Ibid., p. 36.
95 Bassma Kodmani-Darwish, Islamismus und Staat in der arabischen Welt, in: Internationale Politik,
Vol. 52, No. 8, 1997, pp. 19–24, this ref. 22.
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In this kind of political, economic, and social situation, the introduction of a free-trade area
as envisaged in the Barcelona process is an enterprise that is hedged about with risks and
whose chances of success must be regarded as slim.
6.1 Economic Problems
Close inspection reveals that the proposed free-trade area is one of those large-scale struc-
tural adjustment programmes of the type commonly prescribed for the developing countries
since the 1980s by international financial organ zations such as the World Bank and the In-
ternational Monetary Fund. The economy is to be denationalized and deregulated, and the
political-cum-administrative system is to be slimmed down and geared to suit the needs of
the productive sectors of the national economy.
When it comes to the chances of the European Union and the southern Mediterranean
countries actually achieving the stated objectives by means of the proposed free-trade area,
there is unanimous wariness in the specialist literature.96
It is likely, for example – at least in the initial years of any trade liberalization – that those
industries in the Maghreb that have previously been protected by tariffs and that function
less inefficiently than their European rivals, will be pushed out of the picture. In many areas,
imports will be cheaper than Maghreb products. It is very unlikely that producers in the
southern Mediterranean countries will quickly be able, through rationalization and mod-
ernization, to get anywhere close to European levels of efficiency.
The free-trade area will mean the disappearance of tariff revenues that have previously
played a major part in financing the national budget. These revenues served chiefly to fuel
not only the prevailing clientelist power-structures but also, to a limited extent, social relief
measures (such as basic food subsidies).
Despite the unfavourable locational conditions, direct investments in the southern Mediter-
ranean countries – however limited – were previously an attractive proposition for certain
European companies, because high costs were covered by correspondingly inflated prices.
This incentive too will now disappear.97
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1, spring 1998, pp. 51–67.
97 On this, see esp. Charles-Albert Michalet, Investissements étrangers: les économies du s d de la
Méditerranée sont-elles attractives?, in: Monde arabe: Maghreb/Machrek, spec. issue (n. 96), pp. 43–
52.
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Champions of free trade argue that where the price of imported goods decreases, the real
purchasing-power of buyers increases.98  Industries that work with these kinds of imported
inputs could, they say, gain in international competitiveness – and the higher the previous
tariffs, the greater the gain would be.99  However, one important precondition for this is that
there should already been an export industry in any country that is doing away with tariffs.
But this is not the case in the Maghreb countries: their industries are essentially based – as
explained – on minerals and agricultural products and will therefore not profit much from
the free-trade area.100
The Euro-Maghreb free-trade area will therefore only have a beneficial effect on develop-
ment if functioning export-industries emerge. In view of the internally weak capital-market
and the relatively high technological requirements, it would have to be via foreign direct
investments – particularly European ones – that capital and technology flowed into the
Mediterranean countries. As compared with the status quo, the free-trade area would con-
siderably improve the chances of such investments. However, this is only a necessary, not a
sufficient condition for actual investments. The latter depend on the availability of qualified
manpower and adequate services, and of suitable conditions of supply and waste-disposal,
and also on whether the legal and institutional framework-conditions are favourable and
taxes and duties are low.101 In comparison with other regions of the world, however, the
Maghreb does not display any particularly advantageous locational features when it comes
to direct investment from abroad.102
One last option would be for the Maghreb countries to exploit the increased access to the
European markets in order to sell agricultural products and finished goods such as textiles
and clothing. But this is precisely the domain in which EU import barriers still apply – albeit
to a lesser degree than at the time of Barcelona. The southern EU member states, who are
the most vociferous in their support for a European policy on the Mediterranean, are pre-
cisely the ones who are particularly keen to insulate themselves against Maghreb compe-
tition. At the same time, they hope for an opening-up of the European agricultural market.
In view of GATT obligations, this is not excluded, but if it happens, it will take the form of
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a general easing of market access for agricultural products, and this in its turn would dimin-
ish the value of any special preferences accorded to the Mediterranean countri s.103
Taking everything into account, one can therefore conclude that the beneficial economic
effects which a free-trade area between Europe and the Mediterranean would bring to the
Maghreb countries would probably be very modest. The main beneficiaries would be busi-
nesses in the European Union, which would have easier access to the markets of the coun-
tries on the southern edge of the Mediterranean.104  In the Maghreb, it would probably be
the firms already active in foreign trade which, as strong, large-scale players on the market,
would be able to adapt to the new conditions.105  But uch a development is hampered by
the restrictions resulting from EU trade-barriers for agricultural products, the income from
which would be a major source of foreign currency for the southern countries of the Medi-
terranean.
The workers in the firms that would come under pressure to rationalize would also be los-
ers. Even if there were a general economic upturn following liberalization, the same indi-
viduals would not profit from it. Those working in small-scale industries and trades – who
up to now have produced their goods for a protected internal market – and the army of
low- and medium-ranking officials in the state apparatus would also be amongst the disad-
vantaged.106 In contrast, all the experience to date indicates that sections of the formerly
privileged classes will have adequate opportunity to profit from the new situation and to
pass the costs of adjustment on to other groups. This means the deterioration in the social
situation is likely to give added succour to any Islamist opposition – unless other branches
succeed in putting competitive products on offer on the European market, or European
companies create new jobs via „outsourcing“. But, as already explained, both possibilities
are unlikely.
6.2 Political Problems
The creation of a large-scale free-trade area in the Mediterranean region requires – in addi-
tion to changes in the economic order – complementary action to reorganize state finances,
render the administrative structures of the state functional, and build up modern social-secu-
rity systems.
European financial assistance and economic co-operation are tied to conditions in the politi-
cal „pillar“ of the partnership – to advances in democratization and to observance of human
rights. However, the EU cannot push through economic and political transformation in bla-
                                         
103 See also Henri Regnault, Les Échanges agricoles: une exception dans les relations euro-méditer-
ranéennes, in: Monde arabe (n. 96), pp. 31–41.
104 This is underlined by Lionel Fontagné/Nicolas Péridy, The EU and the Maghreb, Paris (OECD De-
velopment Centre), 1997, p. 16.
105 See Nienhaus (n. 96), p. 18.
106 The close enmeshment between public companies and the state bureaucracy is one of the major
reasons why the privatization policy has so far made only halting progress.
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tant opposition to the apparatuses of power (the government and/or the military); it relies
on their willingness to co-operate.107 Th  Barcelona process concerns relations between
states and governments. Any attempt to impose a de ocratization process from outside is
confronted with the dilemma of being dependent on the executive but at the same time
wanting to support dissident forces. Implementation of the Barcelona process will encroach
on established power-based interests in politics and the economy. The effect of a compre-
hensive policy of liberalization and denationalization would be to strengthen the position of
other (private) economic actors and political forces vis-à-vis the old élites. But the EU
wants to make sure that the space that is to be created for the social actors is not occupied
by movements of an anti-Western/anti-European bent that are hostile to the principles and
norms set out in the Barcelona document.
As explained at the outset, there are tentative beginnings of a civil society in the Maghreb
countries. A system of institutional representation of, and exertion of influence by, special-
interest groups has taken shape thanks to the creation of large numbers of national consul-
tative councils for special problem-groups or problem-areas in society.108  The process of
structural adjustment so far has led to a situation in which non-state professional associa-
tions, women’s groups, human-rights o ganizations, and other non-governmental orga iza-
tions have begun to emerge as distinct individual entities.109  Whe her these organizations
are already strong enough to develop into the agents of, and driving force behind, a process
of democratization remains to be seen.
7. The Islamic Challenge and the Barcelona Process
Scepticism about the chances of the Barcelona process succeeding is all the more apt in that
a hallmark of the political situation in all three countries of the Maghreb is the exclusion –
by varying methods – of Islamist groupings. The possibility that the political liberaliz tion
and democratization which the Barcelona process is meant to promote, and the social dislo-
cations associated with the introduction of Euro-Mediterranean free trade, will strengthen
rather than weaken Islamist forces cannot be excluded – in fact, it is quite likely. As far as
the future of Euro-Maghreb co-operation is concerned, therefore, the question of how
European states and societies deal with the possibility of increased Islamist influence in the
                                         
107 See Rainer Tetzlaff, Weltbank und Währungsfonds: Gestalter der Bret on-Woods-Ära, Opladen
(Leske + Budrich), 1996, p. 156 following pages. Tetzlaff cites comparative studies which show that
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108 Sigrid Faath, Stabilität und Autoritarismus in Nordafrika, in: Internationale Politik, Vol. 51, No. 2,
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region (up to an including the sharing or assumption of power) is a crucial one. This being
the case, it is important to get a clear picture of how the relationship of Islamist movements
to the market economy and democracy ought to be viewed.
Ever since revelation-based religions have existed, fundamentalist movements have sought
to make the revealed word of God the sole yardstick for the religious and secular life of
believers living in „theocracies“.110 Such movements retain their dynamism and explosive-
ness in the present age because they represent a reaction to the processes of secula ization
and to the risks associated with globalization.111  This also applies to Islamic fundamental-
ism or Islamism.112  However, the great degree of differentiation between the individual
movements is a central feature, and this is mostly overlooked by the Western public.
7.1 Islam, Islamism, and Capitalism
The Islamic tradition does not really have a specific paradigm for economic affairs. Eco-
nomics and trade have always been regarded as part of general human dealings, and these,
in their turn, are regulated by the provisions of the sharia, or Islamic law113 – though it is
true that the latter includes a whole range of prescriptions and prohibitions which, taken
together, form the framework of an „economic policy“. These include a requirement to pay
alms for the needy into a welfare fund, a ban on ambiguously worded contracts and on
lending money without risk, and a ban on charging interest.114
Schemes for a specific, reform-minded „Islamic economy“ first began to emerge in the
twentieth century, as a reaction to changes in the historical and economic situation in the
Muslim countries.115  Particularly in the eyes of the Islamist opposition in the Maghreb –
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115 On what follows here, see Karen Pfeifer, Is There an Islamic Economics?, in: Beinin/Stork (n. 52),
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in: Hafez (n. 25), pp. 94–108.
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which accuses the various governments of having neglected the social sector – both cen-
tralized economic planning and the free-market approach imported from the West have
failed. Hence, in their view, only an „Islamic order“, strongly geared to moral values, can
assure justice and prosperity. This habit in particular of tying social and economic policy to
a superordinate moral-cum-ethical scheme secures the Islami ts a high degree of credibility
amongst a certain section of the population.
In general, Islamic „orders“ attach a different significance to the individual than does West-
ern capitalism.116  Although the believer may also seek to increase his personal wealth, that
wealth must be tied to the good of the Muslim community and to service to others. Thus
the religious duty to give alms, for example, is much-lauded as an anticipation of the mod-
ern welfare-state. Enrichment via money-deals involving the granting of credit is rejected.
The prohibition on speculation and on the acquisition of money and luxury goods – a prohi-
bition imposed by the Islamic faith – is regarded as proof of the ir econcilability of Islam
and Western materialism.
However, there is no agreement amongst the individual groupings as to what the practical
content of an „Islamic economy“ ought to be. The spectrum extends from „social demo-
cratic“ concepts up to and including vigorous defence of the free market and private prop-
erty. In general – even amongst Islamist groups – no fundamental hostility to a capitalist
market economy is discernible; there is merely a concern to combat its individualistic West-
ern „excrescences“. But the common substructure of values and methods
“does not produce a clear solution to every problem relating to the way society is
ordered. A whole spectrum of projected orders can exist, all of which have been de-
veloped with due consideration for Islamic theory of knowledge and methodology
and can therefore all lay claim to the epithet ‘Islamic’.”117
This means that, economically, the new „Islamic order“ which Islamist opposition-groups
are calling for against the background of a partly ailing, partly rapidly changing economic
situation in North Africa does not have to be either a regression into a medieval Muslim
world or a rejection of Western capitalism and economic co-operation.118
7.2 Islam, Islamism, and Democracy
Tough as it may be to say precisely what constitutes an „Islamic economy“, it will be even
more difficult to specify what „Islam“ and the „Islamists“ who profess it understand by
                                         
116 On the comments hat follow, see Volker Nienhaus, Islamische Wirtschaftsordnungen: Ideale und
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117 Ibid., p. 16.
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„democracy“. That said, there is no disputing the close connection between the process of
liberalization which had begun in the Maghreb countries in the mid-1980s and the emer-
gence of political-cum-religious movements.119  Amongst the Western public, meanwhile, it
is widely believed that democracy and Islam are inco patible.120
The assertion that such antagonism exists is based on an erroneous formulation of the ques-
tion. Every religion based on revelation, laying as it does absolute claim to the truth, is ul-
timately incompatible with democracy’s pragmatic approach of removing questions of re-
ligious truth to the domain of personal conviction and of making the social sphere subject to
a non-violent process of consensus- or majority-based decision-making. Either God (Allah)
is supreme, or the people is. To this extent, the Christian religion too has always been, and
still is, „incapable of democracy“. The question that needs to be posed, rather, is whether
Islamic-influenced cultural circles allow of the sort of spaces for autonomy in the secular
and religious sphere that can serve as a basis for the development of democracy.121
Islamic cultures, for example, combine elements that are „hostile to democracy and plural-
ism“ with elements „conducive to democracy“. Amongst the „hostile“ factors, used by radi-
cal Islamist groupings as an argument for creating a „theocracy“, is the requirement for
unity between politics and religion and the rejection of secularist tendencies. An element
highlighted by experts as being „conducive to democracy“ is the concept, long-established
in Islam, of consultation, consensus, and the right to form one’s own opinion – a concept
also invoked by Islamist movements.122  In addition, it has been clear for some time now
that the idea of „civil society“ is acquiring increasing importance in the political discourse in
Muslim societies – particularly amongst intellectuals.123  Repeated attempts are made by the
various regimes – or by terrorist Islamists – to suppress this discourse, but it continues to
run like a thread through the spiritual debate in the countries of North Africa.124
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Western scholars and politicians often make the separation of politics and religion the sole
yardstick of the capacity of Islamic-influenced countries for democracy.125  This has blinded
us to the fact that there is clearly already, de facto, a separation between – and a whole se-
ries of hybrids of – religion and state in the Islamic countries.
„In the whole of the history of Islam, [there has] not been a single state that was
governed solely according to the rules of the Koran. Rather, the religious law, the
Sharia, has been viewed as a more or less abstract basis for the Islamic state.“126
It is not true to say that the political and religious rule of Ha san II in Morocco represents
the absolute unity of politics and religion, nor that the secular governments in Algeria and
Tunisia have succeeded in effecting a complete separation between state and religion (even
in these countries, Islam is still the state religion).127  What status Islam holds depends not
least on the power relationships within society and on the political calculations of the gov-
ernment, its élites, and the military.128  Islam can be exploited politically both to justify the
status quo and to change it.129
Hence, Islamism is not an inevitable product of „Islamic thought“; it is a spiritual-cum-po-
litical trend that has emerged in a specific historical context, and one that, in addition, is
split into a myriad groups and grouplets.130 These include – significantly, here, also in the
Maghreb – many Islamist groupings who are willing to work to change political-cum-social
reality by non-violent, reformist means – if given the chance.131
Pronouncements about the extent to which the Islamist opposition in the Maghreb is „capa-
ble of democracy“ will necessarily be unsatisfactory if the only thing to which its notions of
political and social order are contrasted is a model of democracy of European-cum-North-
American stamp.132  From this perspective, one will always conclude there is a „democratic
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deficit“. At the national level, the political-cum-religious concepts of the Islamists ought
therefore also to be „offset“ against the democratic plus and minus points of their respective
governments. The same applies to the question of human rights – and indeed to women‘s
rights – in the countries of North Africa.
It is perfectly possible to justify human-rights-friendly positions on the basis of Islamic legal
sources. It is not „Islam“, but at most a particular understanding of it, that causes difficulies
in getting the idea of human rights implemented in the Islamic cultural circle.133
Since it is likely that, in the long term, Islamist groups will have to be accorded a permanent
place in the political spectrum of the Maghreb countries, and that they will become major
actors in the formation of a Maghreb „civil society“ that is independent of the state, the pre-
sent undiscriminating practice of forcing them out of the political sphere, using methods of a
varyingly repressive kind, is counterproductive. All it does is give succour to the militant
Islamist trends.
8. The Chances of Success for the Barcelona Process
The chances of the „Euro-Mediterranean partnership“ succeeding depend on a number of
factors. First, it is crucial that the free-trade area trigger growth in the Maghreb. Secondly,
the societies of the region must be pluralized and democratized. Although free trade without
democratization is possible, in the concrete case of the Maghreb, it also requires the politi-
cal break-up of the state-directed economy that operated there until the 1980s. However, as
already shown, the conditions under which the „free trade + d mocratization = develop-
ment“ strategy would be effective are only very patchily present in the Maghreb countries.
It is probably unlikely that the aims of the Barcelona process will be achieved, even ap-
proximately, by the year 2010.
This prediction is not meant as a fundamental criticism of the European Union’s desire to
help close the North–South development divide in the Mediterranean region – using what
are, in some cases, entirely novel approaches. It is meant as a warning not to expect too
much of the Barcelona process. The main way in which that process can ensure maximum
impact is to support those trends that develop within the Maghreb states themselves, as a
result of internal social changes. External subsidies and practical measures intended to assist
structural adjustment in the economy, and also aids to democratization, can only be effec-
tive if they light upon social and economic actors who actively want to implement them.134
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The chances of this kind of receptivity are, on the whole, not very great in the Maghreb
region; but they are not totally unrealistic, if the individual countries are viewed in a dis-
criminating way. What is more, they would improve if certain shortcomings in the current
implementation of the Barcelona process were remedied by the EU.
In view of the general importance of „good governance“ for the success of a free-trade
area, the task, in general terms, would be to temper the current emphasis on econo ic co-
operation by instituting a policy more strongly geared to the creation of „civil-society“
structures.
Investigations into the effect of World Bank and IMF structural adjustment programmes on
the economic efficiency of the recipient countries have reached mixed conclusions.135  In the
successful cases, they have helped accustom societies and their élites to respond to new
demands more flexibly than before. They have countered the sort of outlook typical of a
„rent-seeking society“ by stimulating elements of „profit-seeking society“.136
The expectation – or, more accurately, the hope – underlying this approach is based on the
notion that people will assume greater responsibility for shaping their future if the state
largely withdraws from the economic sector and is replaced by general framework condi-
tions for economic activity.137  Amongst other things, this could, it is claimed, lead to a
situation in which even those groups that have so far been marginalized by the political sys-
tems in the developing countries become „marketable“, economically and politically. Small-
and medium-sized businesses would emerge and would form the basis of a new middle-
class. This „market economics from below“ would, it is said, be a manifestation of a nasc nt
„civil society“. And that society in its turn would necessitate – because it is dependent on it
– economic stability of expectation, in the form of legal framework-conditions and the free-
dom to rganize. Even though this „new constitutionalism“ would serve primarily to guar-
antee certainty of expectation for foreign capital,138 it is none the less conceivable, so it is
claimed, that the interplay with the emergent civil-society structures would result in the de-
velopment of democratic forms of government.
If one considers the three countries under scrutiny here, their chances of being able to put
what the Barcelona process has to offer for their social and political development to use in
line with the above expectations varies.
Algeria appears to be furthest away from being able to participate in the free-trade area with
a diversified export and import structure; its internal political situation is so blocked that
even the communication framework in the third pillar of the Barcelona process will probably
not have any effect in the foreseeable future.
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Of the three Maghreb countries, Tunisia is the furthest advanced in structural adjustment,
but this process has now come up against the limits imposed on it by the political inflexibil-
ity of Ben Ali’s regime.139
At present, it looks as if Morocco has the best chance of combining structural adjustment in
the economy with a liberalization and pluralization of the political regime. One explanation
for this may be that the country’s monarchical system of government is better able to carry
out economic and social adjustment because it depends for its legitimation not so much on
populist-cum-republican authoritarianism – of the sort that prevails in Algeria and Tunisia –
but on tradition and on the fact that the king controls the military (and not the other way
about).140
Thus, even though the success of the Barcelona process depends overwhelmingly on the
recipient countries, the EU can still make a better contribution to it in future by resolving
some of the present shortcomings in the implementation of the programme.141
For the North African states, however, it would already be something if the EU import bar-
riers for agricultural products and textiles were removed once and for all. The kind of in-
terest-led opposition that would stand in the way of this has already been described. But this
must surely be surmountable, if one considers that only comparatively small sacrifices are
involved and that simple concerns about fishing quotas ought not to determine a central
feature of EU Mediterranean policy. In this case, it is possible for the discrepancy between
lofty symbolism and niggardly practical politics – which will undoubtedly remain part of the
political bartering – to be reduced, provided there are interested states who want this to
happen. If necessary, the southern EU states, which are resisting having a fully-fledged free-
trade area in these sectors as well, must secure compensation elsewhere. The advantages to
the Maghreb countries would, at all events, be much greater than the disadvantages to the
EU.
As explained, any (long-term) stimulation to development which the free-trade area might
produce in the Maghreb countries will only come about if state influence on the respective
national economies is pushed back in favour of a competitive private sector. The impact of
the difficult – and lengthy – transitional phase can be cushioned by financial transfers from
the EU. This means the sums earmarked for economic and financial assistance should on no
account be reduced when the current financial arrangement runs out in 1999. As regards
future implementation, the EU should make specialist training-programmes and local credit-
schemes a particular requirement.
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Up to now, implementation of the Barcelona process has relied too much on governments
and the economic and social structures underpinning them. Of course, it will continue to be
the case that no co-operation can be organized „over the heads“ of governments; but the
European Union could push more strongly for non-state groups, including the Islamists, to
be included in the dialogue process. In the long term, there will be no way round this.
One problem as far as the continuation of the Barcelona process is concerned is that the
development of an intra-societal diversity of interests in the Maghreb also includes the de-
velopment of groups that do not correspond to Western notions of a civil society. Howe er,
Islamist movements should not be excluded from the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue because
of this. Hostility to Islamism is making European societies blind to the diverse forms of Is-
lamic thinking and to the diff rentiations that exist within Islamism itself.
Dialogue will only be possible when the regimes of North Africa begin – either voluntarily
or under constraint – to allow free expression by I lamist groups, movements, and parties,
and when these latter (or at least the most important amongst them) renounce the use of
violence in pursuit of their aims. This goal is still a long way off. Perhaps Europe’s most
important contribution to „Euro-Maghreb partnership“ is to keep stressing that the core
element of any civil society is the non-violent management of conflict.
